

# FI(B)-Refresher 2024

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
# Just Culture

- Theory and literature
- Just Culture at Skyguide
- Examples
- Conclusion and Q&A

# Just Culture Theory and Literature

A culture in which front-line operators or other persons are **not punished** for actions or decisions taken by them that are in accordance with their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, **willful violations** and destructive acts are **not tolerated**.

(EU 376/2014)






Literature




1984 Perrow,  
Normal Accidents




1996, Vaughan,  
The Challenger  
Launch Decision


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
1997 Reason, Managing  
the Risks of Org. Accidents




2001 Weick & Sutcliffe,  
Managing the Unexpected



2007 Dekker,  
Just Culture




2014 Hollnagel,  
Safety I and Safety II



2017 Dekker, Safety  
Differently




# Airliner Accidents Per 1 Million Flights 1977-2017



Statistics are based on all worldwide commercial (passenger) fatal accidents involving civil aircraft with a minimum capacity of 14 passengers, from the ASN Safety Database <https://aviation-safety.net>







Picture: adapted from Austro Control (2016)

# Just Culture at Skyguide



## Just culture policy

Skyguide, with all its employees, is highly committed to fostering and promoting Just Culture within the company. It therefore strives to embody Just Culture, not only formally, but also in everyday work life.

### We adopt the European definition of Just Culture

Skyguide fully supports the European definition of Just Culture according to which Just Culture is "a culture, in which front-line operators or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated."

### We define Just Culture as a culture which encourages mutual trust and open reporting

At Skyguide, Just Culture means a culture which fosters mutual trust. Openness and fair treatment of all staff members are our goal. Just Culture therefore implies a culture that encourages open reporting by supporting staff in the reporting of any matter (including, but not limited to, incidents) which could lead to an improvement in safety and security.

### We focus on intent rather than outcome and foster systemic thinking

Skyguide trusts that all employees act in good faith when they do their work. It is fully understood and accepted that employees may make mistakes, which could lead to undesirable outcomes. Should this occur, Skyguide does not seek to find personal fault or guilt and does not punish staff for making honest mistakes. It seeks to improve the system as a whole instead.

### We protect reporters, safety data and safety information

The protection of reporters as well as safety data and safety information is maximised by a body which is independent from the line organisations. The identity of persons involved in an incident is protected and can solely be accessed according to strict internal rules. Furthermore, Skyguide provides best support to staff members when they are subject to external exposure.

### We foster a Learning Culture

Safety data and information is used for the purpose of learning and improving safety. Skyguide makes de-identified safety information available for all staff in order to learn and create a culture which permits the continuous improvement of safety.

### We do not tolerate unacceptable behaviour

As stated in the European definition, Just Culture does not necessarily mean impunity. Skyguide does not tolerate any kind of deliberate violation, gross negligence or wilful damaging behaviour. In cases where a certain behaviour appears to carry the potential to impair safety, Skyguide's internal safety processes permit a just and fair treatment.

### We live our Just Culture

Skyguide promotes Just Culture and provides training to its staff as required. In order to assess how well Just Culture is lived, Skyguide analyses Just Culture perceptions within the company. Additionally, Skyguide cooperates with external organisations.

Olivier Perrin  
CSO

Alex Bristol  
CEO



# Skyguide's value framework

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## We team up to succeed

- We **trust** each other
- We seek **diversity**
- We include **different perspectives**
- We **span boundaries**
- We **empower**

## We own what we do

- We take **initiative**
- We take **courageous decisions**
- We take **full responsibility**
- We own up to our **outcomes** - good or bad
- We hold ourselves **accountable**



## We drive innovation

- We **move first**
- We **live agility**
- We are **focused & efficient**
- We **learn & improve**
- We **make a difference**

## We create great customer value

- We put **customers centre-stage**
- We **create value together with our partners**
- We **anticipate future needs**
- We **deliver promptly**
- We act **market-focused**

No effective Safety Management System without a positive Safety Culture!



- Occurrence Reporting
- Occurrence Investigation
- Risk Management
- Competency
- SMS documentation
- Safety performance monitoring
- Safety Surveys
- Safety Records
- Safety Audits
- Safety training & education
- Safety communication (lessons learned dissemination)
- Continuous improvement

- Safety training during ATCO training phase
- 4 modules given by Safety Expert
- To build a safety minded culture and compliance to processes

1

- Safety Management System
- Safety Culture
- Just Culture
- Perspectives on human error

2

- Case Study airplane crash (Avianca 52 accident)
- Hindsight bias (Rückschaufehler)
- Systemic occurrence analysis
- Just Culture
- Investigation case study

3

- Safety I and Safety II
- Responsibility of reporting
- Different reports
  - Occurrence report
  - Safety Improvement report
- How to fill a report
- Report analysis process
- Internal investigation process
- Management Of Serious Incidents
- Confidentiality

4

- Recap of Module 1-3




# Management of Serious Incidents

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3 objectives:

- Fair and systematic treatment of licence holders
- Rebuilding trust and shared responsibility for reintegration
- Responding to external expectations while adhering to the JC Principles

Used over 70 times since implementation 2013



Die rote Linie ziehen...

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Grobfahrlässigkeit

Absicht

inakzeptabel

akzeptabel

inakzeptabel


Honest  
Mistake

- Introduction of the Safety Arbitration Process based on EC 376/2014
- In case of doubt about operational practices related to the provision of secure ATM services
- If you have any doubts about the handling of safety data and information
- In case of doubt about the appropriate use and application of Skyguide's internal safety processes



It's about drawing the line...

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# Case Studies

Example 1 (AIRPROX due to overshoot of cleared altitude)

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- Aircraft 1 is cruising at FL100
- Balloon is cleared by the ATCO to max. FL90
- Hot air balloon overshoots the max FL to FL94
- → AIRPROX between the aircraft and the balloon
  
- ATCO is responsible to monitor the adherence of cleared FL
- The aircrew is responsible to adhere to ATC clearance
  
- Is that acceptable behavior by the ATCO and the pilot? Is in line with JC principles?

- More information?
  - The system which compares clearance and adherence was in maintenance
  - There were some unexpected upwinds in the area
  - Pilot was unable to react in time to avoid the overshoot
  - Both the ATCO and the pilot report the incident in order to enable system learning
- Is that acceptable behavior? Is in line with JC principles?

Example 2 (ATCO works with a hangover and is not fit for duty)

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- The ATCO went to a party the evening before and drank some alcohol
  - He slept 4 hours before going on duty for a regular shift in the tower
  - During the first session his colleagues recognize that something was not okay with their colleague and reported it to the supervisor
  - No incident occurred during this first session
- 
- Was the ATCO's behavior acceptable or was it outside the JC frame?



- Airliner is descending towards Zurich Airport under control of Zurich Approach
- In order to allow a smooth descent, the ATCO anticipates the future flight path and clears the airliner to an altitude which is below airspace Charlie in the TMA sector the aircraft currently is
- The airliner descends below airspace Charlie and has an encounter with a glider aircraft in airspace Echo
- The rule is to vector IFR aircraft inbound Zurich Airport only in airspace Charlie
- Was the ATCO's behavior acceptable or was it outside the JC frame?

- More information?
  - It was common to issue anticipated clearances to aircraft in order to allow a smooth descent
  - The airliner increased the rate of descent from 1000ft/ min to 1800ft/min, which was unusual for this aircraft type.
  - The glider was not visible on the radar, as it was not transponder equipped
- Was the ATCO's behavior acceptable or was it outside the JC frame?

## Example 4 (Balloon crosses CTR Zurich)

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- Hot air balloon passes by very close to the boundry of CTR Zurich airport (legal situation).
- Suddenly, radar displays the balloon on the ATC radar screen
- ATCO provides traffic information to a departing aircraft about the target on the radar
- Pilot states that there is a hot air balloon



- The case is investigated
- Everybody behaved as they were trained and according to the rules
- The pilot of the balloon and the ATCO contribute actively and open to the investigation
- The following safety improvement is proposed
  - If an aircraft/hot air balloon is close to a controlled airspace like a CTR, it is recommended to actively inform ATC/ Flight Information about the intentions and position.
  - The transponder should always be on and on 7000
- As nobody acted with gross negligence, the case is within the boundaries of Just Culture

# Conclusion

## Just Culture

- Is defined in the applicable EU regulation
- Is not (yet) fully recognized in the Swiss legal system
- Is the basis for learning and improving aviation safety
- Does not tolerate gross negligence and intentional acts
- Needs to be lived on a daily basis to generate trust
- Is both about “structures and processes”, and “values and behaviors”